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Means and Meaning in Patent Remedies 
Dan L. Burk* 
I. Introduction 
In his article, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 
Professor Sichelman offers a welcome and useful perspective on the reform 
of patent remedies.  His general thesis—that patent law’s policy of 
promoting innovation must take precedence in shaping the outcome of patent 
cases—is surely correct, and his goal of ensconcing innovation as the guiding 
principle of patent remedies is admirable. 
Yet as a teacher of torts and remedies as well as patents, I worry as I 
trace the road he takes toward that goal.  My concern is that he may be 
blazing a trail that is far steeper and rougher than it need be.  I suspect first, 
that he has made some unnecessary assumptions about the nature of the 
remedial enterprise; and second, that his recommendation to “purge patent 
law,” with its undertones of ethnic cleansing or medieval medical treatment, 
is probably needlessly dramatic.  Many of the doctrinal tools that could effect 
his preferred changes are already well-known among scholars of remedies, 
property, and tort—in short, amid precisely the “private” legal regimes he 
says he fears. 
In my discussion of these matters below, I first take up the point 
regarding terminology and characterization, suggesting that the language of 
“making whole” to which Sichelman objects might in fact mean precisely 
what Sichelman wants patent remedies to mean.  I then turn to sketching 
several examples of existing and underutilized tools that might accomplish 
much of Professor Sichelman’s agenda without necessarily fomenting a 
radical reconceptualization of patent-remedies doctrine.  Along the way I 
suggest how such implementation might play out in a variety of current 
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patent controversies, including Sichelman’s example of patent “trolls,” as 
well as FRAND licensing and pharmaceutical “pay for delay” agreements. 
II. Finding New Meaning 
Sichelman argues that patent law’s policy of innovation promotion 
suffers from being characterized as a form of tort, that is, being characterized 
as a system of private rights and wrongs.1  One is immediately tempted to at 
least quibble with this characterization of patent-as-tort in terms of public 
and private wrongs.  It is not at all clear that his characterization of tort 
remedies as addressing “private” wrongs is meaningful.  Since at least the 
publication of Calabresi’s The Costs of Accidents,2 if not before, the 
American discourse on torts has been largely couched in terms of public 
welfare.3  Tort law is now generally seen as a complement or an alternative 
to other public systems such as nationalized health insurance or worker’s 
compensation.4  Tort damages are routinely discussed and calibrated in terms 
of internalizing the costs of social activity, optimizing safety precautions, and 
distributing the losses that arise from socially beneficial enterprises.5 
Neither is it clear that Sichelman’s other points of comparison, such as 
property law, are remedially private in the sense that concerns him.6  
Property law, the quintessential Anglo-American personal possessory 
privilege, is typically justified as a mechanism for harnessing private 
ordering to further the public interest.7  Indeed, patent law is generally lauded 
as a form of property—rather than, say, formulated a system of prizes or 
auctions8—because it incorporates the assumption that rectifying private 
wrongs may be coterminous with optimizing public welfare—a notion that 
stems from the Demsetzian strain of property theory.9  This leaves contract 
 
1. Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 517, 
522 (“I argue in this Article, however, that the traditional view [treating the patentee like a private 
right-holder entitled to traditional private law remedies optimally promotes innovation] is wrong 
. . . .”). 
2. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970). 
3. See Richard A. Posner, Guido Calabresi’s The Costs of Accidents: A Reassessment, 64 MD. 
L. REV. 12, 12 (2005) (tracing the changes in conceptions of torts effected by Calabresi’s pioneering 
work). 
4. See, e.g., MARC A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. RABIN & MICHAEL D. GREEN, TORT LAW AND 
ALTERNATIVES (9th ed. 2011). 
5. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
TORT LAW 58–59 (1987); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 163–65, 181 (4th 
ed. 1992) (hereinafter, POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS). 
6. Sichelman, supra note 1, at 518. 
7. See, e.g., POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 36. 
8. See generally Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes 
Debate, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 303 (2013) (discussing potential structuring of innovation incentives). 
9. See Dan L. Burk, Law and Economics of Intellectual Property: In Search of First Principles, 
8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 397, 405 (2012) (“Property rights are thus believed to align public and 
private interests.”); see also Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. 
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law as perhaps the only major sector of common law jurisprudence 
Sichelman identifies that remains fundamentally private in its remedial 
orientation—although it is not at all difficult to find a public welfare 
justification for contractual remedies as well.10 
The point here is that there is nothing especially private about most 
bodies of “private law” that Sichelman identifies for comparison, and there is 
certainly no particular need to purge torts or property of their private 
remedies in order to effectuate the public welfare goals of either.  Nor is it 
clear that there is a need to purge patent law in order to effectuate its public 
welfare goals.  Sichelman is likely right that courts are stuck in something of 
a rut when it comes to patent remedies—there are certain ossified underlying 
assumptions about what constitutes a harm, and how harms ought to be 
rectified.11  But such myopia likely has more to do with inertia or judicial 
overload than with any principled distinction between public welfare and 
private causes of action. 
Sichelman worries that patent remedies intended to rectify private 
wrongs will tend to provide excessive rewards, or in certain specialized cases 
may provide insufficient rewards, if not calibrated to the particular industry 
to which the patent pertains.12  In previous work with Mark Lemley, I have 
argued that excessive rewards can be avoided, and the proper innovation 
incentive calibrated, by courts employing flexible statutory provisions that 
we term “policy levers.”13  Such provisions, providing judges with a varied 
calibration toolkit, are scattered throughout the substantive weft of the patent 
statute, and include remedial policy levers.14 
Sichelman is essentially focused, as were we, on the proper deployment 
of such remedial levers.  In this regard, his characterization of patent or other 
remedies as restoring the status quo or “making whole” bears some careful 
scrutiny.  Sichelman’s use of this terminology suggests a surprisingly static 
view of its meaning, as if the terms designate one particular remedial 
measure.  But the metric of “making whole,” or as Douglas Laycock has 
cannily termed it, restoring the parties to the “rightful position,”15 is never 
fixed, and instead shifts with judicial purpose. 
This is manifest as between the branches of private law Sichelman 
chooses for comparison to patent law; the hypothetical position in which the 
tort plaintiff was never harmed entails an entirely different set of 
suppositions than the hypothetical position in which the contract plaintiff 
 
REV. 347, 347–50 (1967) (discussing coordination of private incentives and public welfare in rules 
governing physical property). 
10. See, e.g., POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 90–91. 
11. Sichelman, supra note 1, at 518–22. 
12. Sichelman, supra note 1, at 523–26. 
13. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN 
SOLVE IT 109 (2009). 
14. Id. at 128–30. 
15. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 13 (4th ed. 2012). 
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received the benefit of the bargain.  The same observation holds equally true 
within branches of law.  The rightful position of a plaintiff in either tort or 
contract is always shaped by policy and practicality.  And as Professor Lee 
has shown in a related context, restoration of the status quo is an equally 
mercurial concept, based on the selective perception of history and on the 
imaginative re-creation of reality.16  The status quo is never a settled point in 
time, but rather a hypothetical supposition with parameters that fluctuate 
doctrinally, procedurally, and situationally. 
The situation is no different in the patent context.  Consider one of the 
most vexing current injunctive problems to face judges in patent cases: the 
enforcement of a standard-essential patent that has been promised to 
licensors on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms.  Standard-setting 
organizations typically require disclosure of intellectual property interests by 
their members when technological standards are being adopted.17  Patent 
owners in such circumstances are typically required to reveal the presence of 
a patent, and agree that if their technology is adopted as the standard, they 
will make licenses available on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory 
(FRAND) terms.18 
A number of disputes have arisen where a patent holder claims 
infringement of a patent that he had previously promised to license on 
FRAND terms.19  In such a case, is the “status quo” that is to be restored the 
point in time at which the patent holder was free to exercise his exclusive 
rights, that is, prior to promising FRAND licenses?  Or is it the point in time 
after which the patent holder agreed not to exercise exclusivity, that is, after 
FRAND terms were promised? 
This same type of subjunctive plasticity is found not only when 
determining injunctive relief, but is manifest in the damages options 
articulated within the patent statute: lost profits or a reasonable royalty20—
either hypothetical profits that would have been made in the absence of 
infringement, or a hypothetical sum that would be paid by an imaginary 
licensee to a fictional patent holder.  Since we cannot in fact turn back the 
 
16. See Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
109, 166 (2001). 
17. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 
CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1904 (2002). 
18. Anne Layne-Farrar et al., Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: 
Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 671–72 (2007); Joseph Scott 
Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 
40 IND. L. REV. 351, 353 (2006). 
19. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012); Broadcom Corp. 
v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11–cv–
178–bbc, 2012 WL 5416941 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 29, 2012); Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-
CV-01846-LHK, 2012 WL 2571719 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2012); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 
864 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (W.D. Wash. 2012); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Inc., No. 1:11–cv–08540, 2012 
WL 1959560 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2012). 
20. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
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clock to a time before the infringement occurred, we attempt to reconfigure 
the present to the state that it might be in had events followed a different 
path.  The question, however, remains as to what causal factors we suppose 
to have been altered or removed.  Should we assume that the sales made by 
the infringer displaced sales that would have been made by the patent holder?  
Or should the supposition be that the world should be reconfigured as if a 
licensing bargain had been struck? 
Should the effects of the infringement be entirely erased, placing the 
patent holder in an environment that has been scrubbed clean of the 
infringer’s actions?  That is a very tall order for any court to undertake.  Any 
attempt to truly reconstruct a world without the effects of infringement would 
require enormously wide-ranging judicial authority, perhaps rescinding 
consumer possession of illicitly distributed devices, or revising the contours 
of the patent holder’s lost market share.  In no branch of law do we expect 
that any type of remedy is entirely adequate to unscramble the egg, so we 
pick and choose what outcomes seem most pertinent, and we always do so on 
some supposition about the purpose of the statute. 
The question for patents, then, is not whether the patent holder should 
be made whole, nor whether we want to reconstruct the status quo, but 
simply what policies those terms effectuate.  Here Sichelman’s lodestar is the 
Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.21  Justice 
Thomas’s opinion, as Laycock notes, probably confuses the jurisprudence of 
permanent and preliminary injunctions,22 but the opinion does successfully 
reinstate equitable considerations into the permanent injunction calculus: the 
comparative hardship to the parties, the adequacy or inadequacy of monetary 
relief, and the broader public interest.  Note that here “public interest” must 
mean “otherwise unaccounted public interest that is neither effectuated by 
respecting the exclusive rights of the patent holder, nor by limiting the 
application of the exclusive right to the defendant.”  Sichelman in essence 
hopes to extend the public interest calculus of eBay past the injunctive 
context and into the liability calculus of patent damages, and seems to see the 
language of “making whole” as an obstacle.23 
But as I have tried to show here, I am not at all certain that the 
terminology of “status quo ante” or “making [the patent holder] whole” 
always means what Professor Sichelman seems to assume that it does.  I am 
even less certain that the terms are consistent among the subject matter of 
personal or property torts, contract, and patent.  I take Professor Sichelman’s 
point that courts have mechanically or reflexively excluded from the 
meaning of such terms certain public interests that ought to be considered in 
patent law, but those interests may sit very comfortably within the 
terminology as it should be properly understood.  There is no particular need 
 
21. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
22. See LAYCOCK, supra note 15, at 339–40. 
23. Sichelman, supra note 1, at 528. 
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to recast the language of patent remedies, only judicial understanding of it, 
and the Supreme Court’s eBay decision has already taken a step or two in 
that direction. 
III. Finding the Means 
Once we have settled on the specific meaning we want to attach to 
terms such as “status quo ante,” or “making whole,” or “rightful position,” 
achieving the outcome tied to that meaning becomes largely a question of 
whether a court has the remedial tools to get there.  The basic tools in the 
judicial kit, already discussed thus far, are monetary damages and judicial 
orders.  These remedies map onto the categories of either liability rules (a 
right to be paid), or property rules (a right to exclude), under the 
nomenclature famously promulgated by Calabresi and Melamed.24 
But the judicial toolkit of patent remedies seems notably impoverished, 
as Sichelman complains.25  This need not be the case, as the Supreme Court 
demonstrated in eBay.  And as I have suggested elsewhere, even without 
amending the patent statute, courts sitting in equity may have either inherent 
authority to invoke a wider range of remedies, or may be able to find the 
latitude within the statute to do so.26 
For example, Calabresi and Melamed recognized that symmetries 
between the allocation of liability entitlements suggest the possibility of 
bestowing a reciprocal right to be paid on the alleged infringer rather than 
assigning it to the entitlement holder.27  This remedial rule is familiar in the 
real property context as the “reverse liability rule” from the famous Spur 
Industries v. Del Webb28 case.  In the Spur Industries case, a developer of 
residential homes sued to enjoin the nuisance of dust and smells from a 
nearby cattle feed lot, essentially asking the court for an injunction to close 
or move the feed lot.29  Denial or grant of the injunctive remedy would have 
either assigned an exclusive right to the feed lot to produce dust and odor, or 
assigned to the home owners an exclusive right to be free from dust and odor. 
Rather than adopting one of these property rules, the court instead 
fashioned a different remedy.30  It held that the residential developer was 
entitled to an injunction, with a caveat.31  Since the developer had in some 
sense “come to the nuisance,” putting himself and his purchasers in a 
position to be affected by the feed lot dust and smell, the court held that the 
 
24. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
25. Sichelman, supra note 1, at 528. 
26. Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property in the Cathedral, 4 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GEISTIGES 
EIGENTUM 405, 405 (2012). 
27. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 24, at 1116–17. 
28. Spur Indus., Inc., v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972). 
29. Id. at 705. 
30. Id. at 707–08. 
31. Id. at 708. 
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feed lot should not bear the cost of the move.32  The developer’s injunction 
would be contingent on a payment to the feed lot owner to offset the cost of 
moving his operation.33  The developer could of course also choose to forgo 
the injunction and avoid the payment.  This effectively gave the defendant a 
liability right to be compensated if the plaintiff exercised his option to force 
relocation. 
There has been little previous consideration as to how such a rule might 
play out in intellectual, rather than real, property.34  If we were to apply such 
a rule to patents, we would map the developer and the feed lot onto the patent 
holder and the infringer.  Rather than the patent holder receiving a payment 
from the alleged infringer, instead the infringer would be entitled to receive 
the payment if the entitlement owner elected to exercise her exclusive rights.  
I have suggested elsewhere that this type of rule might incorporate the 
desirable features of a liability rule, while better harnessing the private 
valuation information held by parties to a lawsuit.35 
For example, Sichelman discusses the Supreme Court’s shift in eBay 
toward a type of compulsory licensing—a liability rule—rather than an 
automatic injunctive property rule to deal with the problem of nonpracticing 
entities (NPEs) or “trolls.”36  The substitution of a liability rule for a property 
rule in this instance seems to have been fairly successful in curbing the threat 
of overly coercive injunctive remedies.  But consider the advantages of a 
reverse liability rule for the NPE injunctive leverage problem.  Instead of the 
eBay compulsory license option, imagine the application of the Spur 
Industries rule: a court sitting in equity might grant the patent holder its 
injunction contingent on paying the cost that would be incurred if the 
infringer adopts the next-best technological alternative.  This removes the 
threat of shutdown from negotiations over the patented technology, as well as 
any advantage that might come from ambushing competitors who had 
unwittingly adopted a patented technology. 
One might be concerned that the rule could create an incentive to 
infringe, as the worst that could happen would be a subsidized change to the 
next-best alternative technology if caught.  But the answer to this objection is 
that, in balancing the equities of a case, the rule should only be deployed 
where there is evidence of innocent infringement on the one hand, or of 




34. But see Burk, supra note 26, at 409 (discussing the reverse liability rule for intellectual 
property); Dan L. Burk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Molecular Futures: Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Cathedral, in GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS: PATENT 
POOLS, CLEARINGHOUSES, OPEN SOURCE MODELS, AND LIABILITY REGIMES 294 (Geertrui Van 
Overwalle ed., 2009) (same); Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in 
Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 880 (2006). 
35. See Burk, supra note 26, at 411. 
36. Sichelman, supra note 1, at 520–22, 562–64. 
20 Texas Law Review See Also [Vol. 92:13 
 
criteria that are used in deciding whether the eBay rule should apply, and can 
equally well be used to help decide whether a reverse liability rule is 
appropriate. 
This allocative rule would thus add another tool to the courts’ kit of 
remedies, allowing judges to better tailor outcomes to specific situations.  In 
particular, the reverse liability rule addresses the objection that liability rules 
are potentially inefficient because they impose a price set by an adjudicator 
who has imperfect valuation information.  The Spur Industries rule puts the 
patent holder, rather than the judge, back in the driver’s seat, harnessing the 
patent holder’s private valuation.  The patent holder is given the choice 
whether to pay the cost of the injunction or not; if the injunction is not worth 
the cost, he can forgo it. 
The rule therefore serves to separate the trolls from the innovators: 
those who really need exclusivity to establish a market for the product they 
were producing could assert their property rights, but at a price.  Trolls are 
allowed to voluntarily segregate themselves from non-trolls, rather than 
requiring a court to determine who is a NPE and who isn’t.  If the rule is 
applied in the situations of high switching costs identified by Sichelman, it 
similarly segregates out manufacturing entities who value exclusivity by 
requiring them to subsidize the defendant’s switching costs. 
An additional example of the usefulness of the reverse liability rule may 
be found in controversies over patents in the context already mentioned— 
FRAND licensing for standard essential patents.  These are paradigm cases 
of multiple component devices that concern Sichelman.37  Interoperation of 
multi-component technological systems frequently requires some type of 
standardization; indeed, interoperable technologies will tend toward a single 
standard.38  Access to, and adoption of, the standard becomes essential to 
effectively compete in the market, in order for products to be compatible 
with existing systems.39  Consequently, standards that are subject to an 
intellectual property right can convey enormous market power to the owner, 
who may be able to exclude new entrants from the market by restricting their 
access to the standard.40 
There have been some instances where a patent holder has failed to 
disclose, or has allegedly willfully concealed, his proprietary interest until his 
technology is adopted as a standard.41  The reverse liability rule seems almost 
tailor-made to deal with such attempts to enforce such an undisclosed patent 
 
37. Sichelman, supra note 1, at 538–39, 546–50. 
38. Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. REV. 
1041, 1042 (1996). 
39. CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE 
NETWORK ECONOMY 245–48 (1999). 
40. Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 
CALIF. L. REV. 479, 523 (1998). 
41. See, e.g., Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Dell 
Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996). 
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against competitors who have adopted the patented standard under the 
impression that it would be available on FRAND terms.  A court in such 
situations might permit the patent holder an injunction against those using the 
claimed technology, but only if the patent holder is willing to pay the 
switching costs for those who have adopted the standard and who wish to 
change to an alternative.  This would likely deter most patent holders from 
asserting their patents once the patented technology was adopted as a 
standard.  Those who truly wished to assert their exclusivity could do so, but 
at a cost.  The cost might be considered an equitable or restitutionary penalty 
for not dealing openly in the first place.42 
IV. Means to an End 
Some time ago, scholars recognized that the reciprocal liability rules 
described by Calabresi and Melamed closely resemble the financial 
instruments known as “call” options, which are contracts that allow a party to 
buy a commodity at a predetermined price, at that party’s option.43  For 
example, both the liability rules discussed so far—patent damages and patent 
injunctions subject to a reverse payment—take the form of a call option, 
allowing one of the parties to an infringement action to use the claimed 
invention at a price set by the court—essentially a forced purchase of the 
patent asset.44 
If liability rules resemble call options, then this raises the possibility of 
introducing another set of complementary and reciprocal allocative rules that 
resemble “put” options.45  These financial instruments are contracts that 
allow one of the parties to sell a commodity at a predetermined price, at that 
party’s option.46  An analogous juridical remedy, inverse to the liability rules 
discussed above that entitle a party to pay when they choose to infringe a 
right, would give one or the other party the option of being paid to relinquish 
the right to a prospective entitlement.  Put rules may be thought of as 
comprising a two-step decisional process in which the infringer decides 
whether to take the asset, and the entitlement holder then decides whether to 
assert exclusivity or opt for a damages payment.47 
In the context of real property, a number of scholars have pointed out 
that a put option operates as a type of easement, which has its own value 
 
42. See Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1120 (7th Cir. 1983) (opinion by Judge Posner 
reasoning that restitution entails penalties for bypassing market negotiations). 
43. See Ian Ayres, Protecting Property With Puts, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 793, 795–96 (1998). 
44. Cf. id. at 796. 
45. Id.; Ian Ayres & J. M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 731 (1996). 
46. See Ayres, supra note 43, at 796 (explaining the difference between call options and put 
options). 
47. Id. at 800, 823. 
22 Texas Law Review See Also [Vol. 92:13 
 
independent of that of the property to which it is attached.48  Property rights 
subject to such an easement may be worth more than the property right alone, 
and a property owner who is compensated for the value of both entitlements 
may receive more than the value of the underlying property.  Sichelman 
notes that some situations may arise where the traditional measure of 
damages will undercompensate the patent holder relative to the optimal 
incentive; he suggests that some type of additional, possibly publicly funded, 
compensation will be necessary in such cases.49  One can imagine such a 
system built around the value added of a put-type rule, indeed I have 
suggested such a model in some previous work.50 
This type of “put” rule is relatively rare in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence, including in the law of intellectual property, although a few 
examples exist.51  But the rudiments of such a system can be seen in the 
current discussion over “reverse payments” for pharmaceutical patent 
challengers under the Hatch-Waxman Act.52  The Hatch-Waxman Act is a 
complicated series of legislative compromises between original pharmaceu-
tical developers and generic manufacturers.  There is a social need for patents 
to prompt investments into original research for new pharmaceuticals, but 
there is also a social need for early, low-cost competition in the market by 
generic follow-on manufacturers.  One impediment to competition is the 
threat of unnecessary, obstructive patents.  Removing such patents through 
litigation is a high-cost, high-risk undertaking. 
As a reward for undertaking the expense of challenging defective, 
obstructive patents, Congress provided that a follow-on manufacturer who 
successfully challenges a patent is entitled to a 180-day period of market 
exclusivity.53  In such instances, the first follow-on manufacturer who brings 
suit against the patent holds what is effectively an option on a 180-day 
injunctive property right, which could of course be waived in return for a 
payment.  Not surprisingly, patent holders have offered such payments with 
some frequency, essentially offering to split the value of the statutory right.54 
Although this could be conceptualized as a purchase by the patent 
owner of the challenger’s option to proceed in securing market exclusivity—
in other words, purchasing the easement on the patent—the reciprocal 
entitlement structure pointed out above means that the reverse payment is 
 
48. Id. at 799; Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2178–79 
(1997). 
49. Sichelman, supra note 1, at 558–60. 
50. See Burk, supra note 26, at 416–17. 
51. See Ayres, supra note 43, at 814–15. 
52. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 21 
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 35 U.S.C.). 
53. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012). 
54. C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory 
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1560–61 (2006). 
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also essentially a repurchase by the patent owner of its own patent 
exclusivity.  This is a patent subject to an easement, with the option structure 
described above.  In the first phase, the generic challenger decides whether to 
provoke a lawsuit via infringement.  The challenger must then decide 
whether to accept a payment or further invest in litigation to secure the 180-
day exclusion. 
The payment offered to the challenger in such instances has been 
largely the subject of ex post negotiation rather than a predetermined exercise 
price—not quite the paradigm of the option contract that was described 
above.  However, under the recent decision of the Supreme Court in FTC v. 
Actavis, Inc.,55 such payments are subject to a judicial rule-of-reason 
analysis.56  Thus, the price for which a patent challenger can waive 
exclusivity is now limited, if not set, at some level by judicial oversight, 
similar to the familiar judicial determination of damages for liability “call” 
rules.  And, significantly for Professor Sichelman’s agenda, the Court’s 
Actavis opinion suggests that this judicial calculus includes elements of the 
public interest, including both the interest in promoting innovation through 
exclusivity and the interest in promoting efficient competition. 
V. Conclusion 
Professor Sichelman is surely right that patent remedies need to be 
reimagined, although as I have indicated here, I am not certain that I endorse, 
or even entirely understand, his premise that current patent remedies are 
necessarily founded on the correction of private wrongs.  But I am relatively 
certain that the premise neither drives his analysis nor is necessary to his 
prescriptions.  To the extent that he calls for the public interest in innovation 
to be more fully incorporated into the remedial calculus, this requires perhaps 
some reorientation of judicial attitudes, but not necessarily a reorientation of 
remedial patent doctrines.  And to the extent that he recommends a broader 
array of remedial outcomes, many of the needed tools are already available.  
They need only to be recognized and employed. 
 
55. 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013). 
56. Id. 
